

**FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

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**BACKGROUND INFORMATION DOCUMENT ON COMPLIANCE BY STATES
PARTIES WITH ALL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND
STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN
WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

Prepared by the Secretariat

1. In paragraph 21 of its report (BWC/CONF.IV/1), the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction decided to request the Secretariat to compile a background information document on compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the Convention. The Preparatory Committee, furthermore, decided that for the purpose of preparing this document, the Secretariat would request State Parties to provide information regarding compliance with all the provisions of the Convention.

2. The present document contains the information provided by States Parties to the Secretariat, as of 28 October 1996, pursuant to paragraph 21 of the report of the Preparatory Committee.

Australia

Article I

Australia has never developed, produced, stockpiled, or acquired biological weapons or the weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. We fully support the aims and objectives of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and is strongly opposed to the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and their means of delivery. We have actively participated in the efforts to strengthen the Convention, initiated at the Third Review Conference, including the Ad Hoc Group of Verification Experts, the 1994 Special Conference and the ongoing Ad Hoc Group negotiations.

Article II

In view of the situation outlined above, article II does not apply to Australia.

Article III

Australia is fully in compliance with article III. In fulfilment of its obligations under article III of the BWC, the Australian Government has promulgated regulations which require relevant exporters to obtain a licence for the export of specified biological agents, toxins and equipment which would be used in a biological weapons programme. Licences are required for the export of the following biological weapons-related items: biological agents designed or adapted to produce casualties in human beings; equipment designed or adapted for disseminating biological agents; goods designed or adapted for the detection, identification or defence against biological agents; and goods including software designed or adapted for the purposes of producing any of the previous items.

These measures are reinforced by the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 which provides the supply of any good, the provision of any service or the export of any material not regulated under the measures outlined above, if this supply or export is likely to assist a plan or programme for the development, production, acquisition or stockpiling of biological weapons.

Australia has also developed Guidelines - to prevent the inadvertent supply of biological weapons-applicable plant, equipment, source cultures and expertise - which are a non-statutory, non-proliferation measure, developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to raise the awareness of industry and researchers about the risk of inadvertent involvement in the biological weapons programmes of other countries. The Guidelines have been circulated to the biological industry, universities, relevant professional associations and government agencies.

Article IV

This provision of the Convention is given effect in Australia through the following national legislation.

Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976

The Act, which is administered by the Attorney-General, makes it unlawful for Australians to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The Act extends to the acts of Australian citizens outside Australia. Contravention of the Act is an indictable offence.

Crimes (Biological Weapons) Regulations 1980

The Regulations specify the way in which substances acquired under the Act should be stored, disposed and analysed.

Customs Regulations

Regulations administered by the Customs Service and the Minister for Defence control the export of defence and related goods from Australia, through a system of export licences. Licences are required for the export of the following biological weapons items: biological agents designed or adapted to produce casualties in human beings; equipment designed or adapted for disseminating biological agents; goods designed or adapted for the detection, identification or defence against biological agents; and goods including software designed or adapted for the purposes of producing any of the previous items. Export licensing requirements have been introduced on biological agents and toxins in the form of regulations, which came into effect in December 1993. The regulations prohibit the export without a licence of certain human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins not intended for use as vaccines.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 and Regulations

The Act is administered by the Department of Defence and complements the existing barriers contained in the Customs Act 1901 and the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations. It prohibits the supply or export of goods, not otherwise controlled by the Customs Act 1901, or to provide services, in circumstances where the goods, or the services, will or may be used in, or assist the development, production, acquisition or stockpiling of biological weapons or their delivery systems. The prohibitions under the legislation apply where the person involved knows or suspects the connection with a biological weapons programme. The Act applies extraterritorially as well as within Australia, covering the activities of Australian citizens or residents, as well as bodies incorporated in Australia. It provides a mechanism for exporters to obtain written guidance from the Government on the risk of a particular planned transaction contributing to a biological weapons programme, if the exporter believes there is a possibility of a particular planned transaction contravening the Act.

Article V

Australia has not formally invoked the provisions of article V, nor has any other State Party invoked the provisions of article V to engage in consultations with Australia. Australia fully supports the Confidence Building Measures developed at BWC Review Conferences and has contributed a detailed return for each year since the 3rd Review Conference.

Articles VI and VII

Australia has not invoked the provisions of articles VI and VII.

Australia continues to provide a significant level of assistance to the United Nations Special Commission, established under UNSCR 687, to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, including its biological weapons programme.

Article IX

Australia worked actively and constructively to support the conclusion of the negotiations towards the Chemical Weapons Convention. It ratified the Convention in May 1994.

Article X

Australia believes article X of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a key element of the treaty and is strongly committed to promoting the economic and social development, and the scientific and technological progress, of all countries without discrimination in the field of biotechnology. Australia provides assistance, specifically to countries in the Pacific and South-East Asia, in the areas of health and disease control and education and training in the range of biotechnology and related fields. Australian universities and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) are involved in numerous cooperative research projects with a range of developing countries. Australia contributes to numerous academic, scientific and industrial databases which facilitate access to information in the biotechnology area. Two databases, CSIX and ABOA, are operated by CSIRO and are available to researchers in developing countries.

The Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) is involved in numerous programmes promoting cooperation in the field of biotechnology research, development and application between relevant groups in Australia, and other, particularly developing, countries. Australia contributes actively to the work of a number of international bodies such as the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Belarus

Article I

The Republic of Belarus has never developed, produced, stockpiled or acquired biological weapons or the weapons, equipment or means of delivery for using such agents for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

In view of the foregoing, article II does not apply to Belarus.

Article III

Belarus is in full compliance with article III.

Article IV

Belarus has instituted the appropriate legislative machinery to honour its obligations under the Convention.

Article V

Belarus has not formally invoked article V, and the article has not been invoked against it.

Articles VI and VII

Belarus has not invoked these articles.

Article IX

Belarus has signed and ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, and on Their Destruction. Its instrument of ratification was deposited on 11 July 1996.

Belarus advocates the swift ratification of the Convention by other States and the Convention's entry into force.

Article X

Activities covered by this article of the Convention are carried out in the Belarusian Ministry of Health's Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology Research. All research on micro-organisms and toxins is exclusively for peaceful ends and consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Convention; it is conducted openly and the findings are published in scientific works.

Belarus provides the United Nations every year with information on the investigations in the fields of biology and epidemiology that are in progress in the country.

The Ministry of Health is responsible for gathering information on infectious diseases in Belarus.

The Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology Research is conducting a programme to protect the population from the most widespread vectors of infectious and parasitic diseases in the Republic. The aim of the programme is to develop means and methods of diagnosing, preventing and treating viral and bacterial infections (including quarantinable and notifiable diseases).

Immunobiological test-systems for the rapid diagnosis of the agents responsible for Lassa, Machupo, Marburg and Ebola haemorrhagic fevers have been produced and proved in practice, and an effective system of epidemiological monitoring for these diseases has been developed. This may be of use in areas where such infections are prevalent.

Bulgaria

1. As it has been repeatedly stated, the Republic of Bulgaria has never planned, developed and produced biological and toxin weapons (BW). Such activities have never been delegated to the competent Bulgarian military (The Ministry of Defence and the Bulgarian Army Medical Service (BAMS)) and civil research units.

In certain past periods experimental laboratories of the Military Medical Academy (MA) have been only engaged in research on diagnostic preparations for identification of pathogens, potentially applicable as BW. Some studies have been carried out on the prophylactics and treatment of BW victims.

The Republic of Bulgaria has taken active part in the discussions on the principles of the Convention in the course of its elaboration and was one of the first to sign and ratify it. It has been strictly implementing all BTWC provisions and has taken every possible measure to ensure its compliance.

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the State Parties to the BTWC, the Republic of Bulgaria delivers regularly in its annual reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the information relevant to the confidence-building measures.

The Republic of Bulgaria is looking forward to achieving maximum progress in the negotiations under way in the Ad Hoc Group established in September 1994 by the Special Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC by overcoming some serious deficiencies of the verification regime in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. This will have important consequences for our country in terms of reinforcing the national security and of expanding of the possibilities for large-scale cooperation and exchange in the field of scientific information, research contacts among experts from the States Parties, integration in the world's computer information networks and the cooperation in the sphere of biotechnologies.

2. The Republic of Bulgaria considers the process of further broadening the transparency in the scientific field, relevant to the BTWC, as an important factor for strengthening the Convention. In order to be fully and durably effective research transparency should be comprehensive and should include all countries.

As examples of this trend the following developments could be brought forward:

- a considerable increase of the number of publications by Bulgarian authors in the field of microbiology, virology, epidemiology and biotechnology in foreign research magazines partly due to the newly established national standards for attainment of doctoral thesis and academic ranks;
- a growing participation of Bulgarian experts with scientific reports in congresses and conferences held abroad and in specialized studies, taken in foreign research institutes;

- elaboration of joint research studies with the participation of foreign experts, in the field of microbiology, virology, epidemiology and biotechnology;
- initial work on the publication of the results from research activities in the past on problems of diagnostics, prophylaxis and treatment of eventual BW victims;
- willingness to accept on-site inspections in microbiological, virusological and other specialized laboratories on the basis of reciprocity and as an experiment, evaluating the effectiveness of such verification measure in the future BTWC regime.

3. The specialized institutions of the Republic of Bulgaria have submitted the following information on recent research developments relevant to the problems of the national security and safety and in some correlation with the BTWC:

A. The Military Medical Academy (MMA) - Sofia

A joint study with the participation of foreign experts on antibiotic resistance of hospital strains mediated by plasmids.

B. The Institute of Microbiology at the Bulgarian Academy of Science - Sofia

A joint project with the participation of a team from the Faculty of Physics at Sofia University - "Investigation of the influence of natural and synthetic antioxidants over the influenza infections" concerning the application of antioxidants in case of viral infections - submitted to the National Fund "Scientific researches", Scientific Expert Commission on Medicine.

A project "Viral inhibitors - ligands of viral proteins" conducted by Professor Dr. A. Galabov on the application of viral inhibitors against flaviviruses of the models representing the type flaviviruses congenial with the hepatitis C type of pestiviruses. The study is dedicated to two original Bulgarian compounds SU (cyclic carbamide) and MM (benzodioxanic derivative).

The two projects mentioned above are now in the process of implementation and there are some intermediate results, presenting a model of extremely dangerous infections with viral etiology.

Some research works are in process concerning the early detection of the agents of zoonoses in food products of animal origin.

The lack of an express method, applied for the isolation and creation of a scheme for identification of micro-organisms of Yersinia and Listeriosis type in food products of animal origin creates the necessity of developing such new method.

At a stage of preliminary organization of the work is the project "Ecological protection of the water reservoirs (ecological status and possibilities for decontamination of pathogen bacteria)".

The work envisaged under this project will provide for the possibility to solve some ecological problems such as cleaning up through photo-sterilization of water reservoirs polluted with pathogen micro-organisms.

A project "Microbiological pollution of the reactive fuels and possibilities for their protection" has been in process since 1994 in collaboration with the Scientific Institute at the Ministry of Defence and some practical results are expected in the near future.

In collaboration with the Institute of Organic Chemistry and the Centre for Phytochemistry a project "Interrelations between the chemical structure and the biological activity (antiviral, antimicrobial and immunomodelling) of some natural substances" is now being developed.

The antibacterial activity of about 100 substances towards different bacterial species have been investigated, more than 120 plant extracts - checked up for possible effect on representatives of different types of viruses, some of which are of great importance for the medical practices and on the other hand - capable to be used as BW. More than 100 chemical substances have been tested for immunomodelling effect.

C. The National Centre of Contagious and Parasitic Diseases - Sofia

The Centre is the sole research and practical national institution producing about 700 types of bio-preparations of bacterial, viral and parasitic origin, designed for specific diagnostics, treatment and prophylaxis of contagious and parasitic human diseases - vaccines, serums etc. Profound scientific investigation works many of which with the participation of eminent specialists from different countries are carried out in the National Centre under different bilateral or multilateral projects and contracts, financed by programmes like PHARE, TEMPUS, COPERNICUS, etc., but none of them intended to develop or study any of the forms of BW.

Canada

General Comments

It is the Canadian view that the request emanating from the Preparatory Committee meeting in April 1996 embraces not only national observance of legally binding obligations established by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), but also politically binding obligations resulting from undertakings of States Parties as reflected in the Final Documents of past Review Conferences. In this regard, politically binding obligations relating to the submission of annual declarations under the agreed Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) should also form part of the secretariat's report. This Canadian submission does not attempt to embrace all of the information that we have provided under the CBMs, and should be seen as complementary to those submissions.

Article I

Canada is in full compliance with its obligations under article I. Furthermore, in keeping with the politically binding obligation of the CBMs, we have reported on the nature of the Canadian biological weapons programme as it existed historically and as terminated long before the entry into force of the BTWC; and we continue to encourage other States Parties to reply at an appropriate level of detail.

Article II

Canada is in full compliance with its obligations under article II, and once again we refer States Parties to the text of our replies under the CBMs for other related information.

Article III

Canada is in full compliance with its obligations under article III. Since the BTWC entered into force in 1975, Canadian measures to implement its obligations have evolved with a view to ensuring, to the extent possible, that materials, equipment and technical expertise would not be transferred to any recipient, directly or indirectly, to contribute to a biological weapons programme. This we have done through the Export-Import Permits Act, and related regulations, so that national authorities maintain the necessary oversight of transfers and have the necessary legal authority to intervene should there be any uncertainty or suspicious activity that would warrant such intervention.

Article IV

It was the Canadian view at the time of our ratification of the BTWC that Canada's existing laws and processes allowed us to meet fully our obligations under article IV of the BTWC. None the less, Canadian authorities periodically review the issue, in particular to prepare for the BTWC Review Conferences. The matter is once again under consideration by Canadian authorities, especially with respect to the use of related materials for terrorist activities. Canada will be reviewing its domestic legislation to ensure that effective measures are in place to address such concerns in relation to the BTWC.

Article V

Canada has not invoked article V, nor has any other State Party invoked article V in order to engage Canada in consultations. We fully support article V, and we do not interpret it as being a prior stage that needs to be invoked before proceeding to article VI of the Convention, should circumstances so warrant. Canada fully supports the politically binding agreements reached at the Second Review Conference and the Third Review Conference concerning the exchange of information under the heading of Confidence Building Measures, and we have consistently participated in every one of these exchanges.

Article VI

Canada has not invoked the provisions of article VI nor has any other State Party invoked the provisions of article VI against Canada.

Article VII

Canada has not been requested to provide assistance under article VII.

Article VIII

This is to recall that Canada advised the Third Review Conference that Canada has modified its reservations to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on 17 June 1925, by removing Canada's reservations to the Protocol in so far as they relate to bacteriological methods of warfare.

Article IX

Canada contributed actively to the conclusion of the negotiations leading to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and deposited its instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in September 1995.

Article X

Canada contributes in many ways, bilaterally and multilaterally, to economic and technological development programmes consistent with the article X provisions of the Convention. These contributions take a wide variety of forms including: student exchanges; professional exchanges; convening of conferences open to interested professionals; training courses such as in the fields of biosafety with respect to the handling of human and animal pathogens; assistance in the provision, directly or indirectly, of expertise that contributes to the detection, diagnosis and treatment of disease; cooperative research projects; database creation and exchange, for example BIONET; and other activities, some of which are also represented in our CBM returns related to the encouragement of the publication of results and promotion of the use of knowledge (CBM "C") and active promotion of contacts (CBM "D").

Colombia

1. Activities prohibited under the Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons Convention are not being and have not been carried out in Colombia.
2. Colombia has no information on new scientific and technological advances of relevance to the Convention, or on their uses.

Cyprus

Cyprus does not develop nor does it produce or is stockpiling bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

It is also stated that there are no research centres or workshops for the above-mentioned purpose.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic is in full compliance with all the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention. All activities in this field have been dedicated to peaceful purposes and the Czech Republic has been presenting information concerning those activities in compliance with the agreed Confidence Building Measures.

Denmark

Denmark wishes to confirm that it strictly adheres to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Denmark maintains no national biological defence research and development programmes and has never engaged in such activities. Denmark continues to comply fully with all its obligations under the Convention.

As far as new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention are concerned, Denmark has no comments to offer.

Finland

Finland has complied with all provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons. Finland has complied with the provisions of article X concerning the exchange of information on the use of bacteriological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. In addition Finland has participated in the implementation of the measures agreed upon at the Third Review Conference.

France

France wishes to convey to the Secretary-General of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction the following information concerning its compliance with its obligations under that Convention:

(1) Application of the 1972 Convention

Before acceding formally to the 1972 Convention, France passed Act No. 72-467 dated 9 June 1972, prohibiting "the development, manufacture, possession, stockpiling, acquisition and transfer of biological or toxin-based weapons".

The Act, which stipulates criminal prosecution in the event of breaches of the prohibition, established obligations identical to those under the Convention - even, in some cases, more stringent ones. Any research that could be related, even indirectly, to offensive operations had been halted;

defensive operations (detection, decontamination, etc.), which the Convention did not ban, had been transferred from the Ministry of Defence to civilian departments. All the institutional structures had been reduced in consequence, and the very word "biological" had been removed from the names of the bodies formerly concerned.

Thereafter, France did accede to the Convention under Act No. 84-547 dated 4 July 1984, which authorized French accession. The accession took effect on 27 September 1984.

Since the Act of 9 June 1972 was in effect, the entry into force of the 1972 Convention for France caused no great upheaval. As regards offensive capability, the abandonment of all work since 1972 of course became still more positive, in so far as that was possible, and no more work of any description had been done in that domain. As for biological defence, the entry into force of the Convention coincided with the restoration to the Ministry of Defence of research activities in that area, including risk evaluation. Such research, coordinated by the Ministry, has since been conducted in laboratories subordinate to the Ministry or in public or private institutions operating under contract with the Ministry. Most such research is published in the scientific literature and described under the confidence-building and security measures (measure C) in which France acquiesces each year as agreed at the Second and Third Review Conferences.

(2) Application of particular articles

The obligations under articles I and IV are covered by Act No. 72-467 described above.

The obligation established under article III (not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, any of the agents, toxins or weapons covered by article I of the Convention) has led France to adopt a collection of domestic and European Community legislation, the most recent items of which are:

The Decision and Regulations adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 19 December 1994, which took effect on 1 July 1995, establishing Community export controls on dual-purpose items;

Decree No. 95-613 concerning export controls on dual-purpose items;

An order dated 5 May 1995 concerning controls on the export to third countries and to States members of the European Community of dual-purpose items;

An order dated 5 May 1995 concerning controls on the export of dual-purpose items in connection with anti-chemical and biological proliferation efforts.

In accordance with this legislation, France applies controls to a number of products and items of equipment as stipulated in the texts above. Export licences are awarded subject to precise criteria. They can apply case by case (to individual transactions) or be of indefinite application.

Article IX: France signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction on 13 January 1993 and ratified it on 2 March 1995.

Turning to the obligations under article X (to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information; to implement the Convention in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties), on 30 November 1995 France submitted a document (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.19) to the third session of the Ad Hoc Group on the strengthening of the Convention, describing how it was complying with these obligations. The document described in outline what France was doing as regards scientific cooperation in biology and medicine and offered a synopsis of the international scientific partnerships in which French bodies and companies were engaged on the industrial scene. An updated version is annexed to this note verbale.

France has also ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity (the Rio Convention) by Ratification Act No. 94-477 dated 10 June 1994. The Convention entered into force for France on 29 September 1994.

Annex

1972 Convention - Implementation of article X

Article X:

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate [...] the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes [...].
2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological agents and toxins [...].

Introduction

The present document aims to illustrate the way in which France fulfils its commitments under article X of the 1972 Convention (I). It outlines French efforts as regards scientific cooperation in biology and medicine (II), provides a concrete example of this cooperation by presenting the exchange programme of the Institut Pasteur (III) and, regarding industrial activity, outlines the international scientific partnerships entered into by a French company, Pasteur Mérieux Connaught (IV).

I. Article X

The Ad Hoc Group appointed in September 1994 by the Special Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons has as its objective to strengthen the Convention by considering a protocol to include inter alia:

Specific measures, including verification measures;

Specific measures designed to ensure the implementation of article X of the Convention.

These measures are closely linked: close cooperation between States will be necessary for the implementation of the future compliance measures; credible verification measures allowing, for instance, on-site inspections can only help to reinforce existing cooperation in the field of biology in the broad sense of the term. It is also to be noted that cooperation as described in article X has not been prevented or limited by export controls set up in accordance with article III of the Convention by groups of supplier countries.

II. Cooperation in biology and medicine

France values international cooperation in the life sciences and invests substantial sums of money in it. French teams working in the life sciences are today a potent presence in international relations.

First and foremost, France participates in international cooperation through the international bodies it belongs to, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Health Organization, UNESCO and the European Molecular Biology Organization.

Nationally, a variety of institutions facilitate exchanges and cooperation. Cooperation programmes may be set up by ministries or by research bodies, universities and so forth. Most French universities have entered into agreements with foreign universities, laying down the framework for cooperation. Research institutions such as the Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale (INSERM, National Institute of Health and Medical Research), the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS, National Centre for Scientific Research), and the Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA, National Institute for Agronomical Research) have signed exchange agreements with research institutes in many countries (30 in the case of INSERM, 65 in the case of CNRS) establishing the budgets and arrangements for reciprocal exchanges. A variety of fellowship schemes finance researchers attending courses in France (fellowships offered by the French Government and by international programmes in which France participates). And universities and research bodies have positions against which they can place teaching and research staff and foreign research workers.

Workers at French biological and medical research laboratories include increasing numbers of foreign researchers. The number of places available per year for foreign researchers in the sector (at all levels, irrespective of duration) is roughly 6,500. Foreign researchers are accepted at all public biological and medical research laboratories affiliated to the Universities, INSERM, CNRS, and INRA, and research foundations such as the Institut Pasteur in Paris (see III). The relevant laboratory costs alone amount to 300 million francs. Some researchers are taken on in restricted access

laboratories ^{1/} in the fields of biology, biomedicine and microbiology (by way of illustration, in 1992-1993, restricted French laboratories played host to 32 researchers from Cuba, 111 from India, 195 from Syria, 442 from China, to cite only a few of the countries with which French research institutions conduct exchanges).

Europe is at present a favoured venue for French scientists, thanks in part to the various segments of the European Union's fourth Framework Programme on Research, Development and Technology, such as Biotechnology (BIOTECH), Biomedicine and Health (BIOMED) and Researcher Training and Mobility. Collaborations with teams in the United States and Japan continue to play a very important role in certain sectors of the life sciences.

The opening up of Central and Eastern Europe has permitted numerous exchanges with scientific communities. North-South collaboration, especially in the Mediterranean context, is also becoming increasingly important. The strategy of openness is being applied at both the ministry and the research-body level. Since 1985, for example, INSERM has set up 58 specific North-South networks. The five it set up in 1995 embrace teams in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Tunisia, and African units in Benin, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. They are concerned with parasitic diseases; genetic disorders; infectious diseases; malnutrition; and maternal and child health. Since 1993, other networks have been set up with Central and Eastern European countries (33 East-West networks).

While continuing to nurture its priority relations with Europe, the United States and Japan, the life sciences department of CNRS now wishes to bolster its collaboration with Asian countries, as witness some recently launched projects:

Cooperation with Viet Nam over the dengue virus;

Two workshops, on immunology and developmental biology, at the Shanghai Institute of Cellular Biology (China) and a joint Sino-German laboratory with the Max Planck Foundation;

Activities with Taiwan (bilateral seminars, placement of post-doctoral students);

Diverse activities (neuroscience and genomic science) with Japan.

Also of note are a training workshop and project to collaborate on human genetics with Lebanon; a collaboration with the Faculty of Science in Tunis on nuclear DNA polymorphism; and the development of the Franco-Tunisian School of Molecular Biology.

^{1/} Restricted access laboratories are those for which, owing to the sensitive nature of the material being studied and pursuant to French law and article III of the 1972 Convention (non-proliferation), prior authorization must be obtained by all foreign researchers seeking admission.

Partnership with countries in the South is the preserve and raison d'être of the Institut français de recherche scientifique pour le développement en coopération (ORSTOM, the French Research Institute for Cooperative Development). ORSTOM was among the founders, in 1993, of the scientific interest group for development, whose aim is to increase research capacity in the South by supporting teams centred around established researchers for a period of six years. ORSTOM includes a health department half of whose members work directly on vectorally transmitted diseases. It is involved in a number of activities in this sector, including the fourth Framework Programme segment on scientific cooperation with third countries and international organizations (INCO-DC):

Epidemiology of filovirus infections in the Central African Republic;

Investigations, in regions where Plasmodium falciparum (the parasite responsible for malaria) is holoendemic (Senegal) and mesoendemic (Brazil), into human cellular and humoral immune responses to recombinant antigens and synthetic peptides identified as candidate anti-malaria vaccines;

Development of tools for characterizing Meloidogyne chitwoodi and related phytoparasitic nematodes (with INRA);

Use of natural marine products to combat tumours and viruses and to modulate immune responses (with the University of Nantes).

All in all, French teams are currently involved in 16 European projects in the health domain selected in the first call for proposals under the INCO-DC programme. Besides European countries, their partners are mainly African and Latin American countries.

III. The Institut Pasteur and international cooperation

Since it was founded by Louis Pasteur in 1887, the Institut Pasteur has been at the centre of a vast network of international relations. Around 500 foreign researchers in various biotechnological disciplines visit the Institut Pasteur every year.

The Institut Pasteur has signed cooperation agreements with several prestigious foreign institutes such as the Weizmann Institute of Science (Israel), the RIKEN (Japan), the Institut de recherche clinique de Montréal - the Clinical Research Institute of Montreal (Canada), the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Brazil) and the National Institute of Immunology (India).

The most original aspect, however, of the Institut Pasteur's relations abroad is its role at the hub of the International Network of Pasteur Institutes grouping 25 institutes all over the world (in Bangui, Nouméa, Phnom Penh, the associate Bolivian Institute of La Paz, in Saint Petersburg, Tehran, etc.).

The Scientific Committee of the International Network of Pasteur Institutes and Associate Institutes was set up in 1994 and is responsible for strengthening scientific collaboration. As an example of its activities,

in 1994 the Virology Study Group brought together for a week all the players involved in research in virology to examine the following subjects: arboviruses and viral haemorrhagic fevers, poliovirus, HLTV and the AIDS virus. For its part, the Parasitology Study Group conducts particularly active research on malaria (epidemiology and immunology, with a view to developing a vaccine). Discussions on the establishment of a new study group on emerging diseases (pathogens with epidemic potential) began recently.

The Network of Pasteur Institutes, by its activities and presence across five continents, is participating in the transfer of knowledge by playing an important role in public health domains that are increasingly important at world level. It encourages and promotes the fullest possible exchanges on pathogens and biotechnological know-how and equipment by mobilizing its scientific potential, in particular for developing countries.

IV. International cooperation in industry: outline
of activities abroad of a French industrial group

The transfer of knowledge in the field of "bacteriological (biological) activities for peaceful purposes" is not carried out solely by research laboratories but also by means of direct contacts between industrial companies, international scientific partnerships, commercial contracts or the setting-up of joint ventures.

Examples of the international activities of the Pasteur Mérieux Connaught Group, the world leader in vaccines, include:

In the field of tropical diseases, a scientific partnership agreement with Mahidol University, Bangkok (Thailand), aimed at developing a vaccine against the dengue virus, a disease which is a major public health problem in South-East Asia;

A scientific cooperation agreement with China to develop a vaccine against the Japanese encephalitis virus, as well as a commercial agreement for the distribution of the vaccine against the rabies virus;

In the field of animal health, inauguration in Japan of the laboratory of the Phylaxin subsidiary of the Rhône Mérieux Group, to manufacture avian biological products;

An agreement with Cornell University (United States of America) for the development of a new vaccine against tuberculosis;

An agreement with the American biotechnological company ORAVAX to develop, manufacture and distribute vaccines for the prevention of infections induced by Helicobacter pylori;

Participation in a multifocal international programme to validate candidate vaccines against bilharzia under a World Health Organization project.

Conclusion

The sole aim of the few examples given above is to show the diversity of forms and channels and the scope of the effort being undertaken by France, its research institutions and companies to participate in global exchanges for the development of the use for peaceful purposes of modern biotechnology with its promise of rapid progress in both the immediate and the near futures.

This cooperation, conducted on a mutually profitable, non-discriminatory basis and open to all regions of the world, can only be strengthened by the implementation of effective and legally-binding control measures within the framework of a sound verification regime for the 1972 Convention.

India

India has complied with all the obligations under the Convention.

Italy

Italy has taken the necessary measures to implement the Convention on the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction which was signed on 10 April 1972 and, following the relevant act of the Parliament, ratified on 30 May 1975. Italy is in full compliance with all its obligations under the Convention.

Lebanon

The Ministry of National Defence has nothing to say on this topic.

Luxembourg

Luxembourg has nothing to report in this area.

Netherlands

The Netherlands would like to provide, in response to the request of the Provisional Secretary-General of the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the following background document regarding its compliance with all the provisions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

1. Implementation of the Convention

The Netherlands signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972 and ratified the Convention on 22 June 1981. The domestic Biological and Toxin Weapons Act was enacted on 25 March 1981. This legislation provides for the necessary measures to be taken under domestic law to enable the Netherlands to fulfil its obligation under the Convention.

The Netherlands is in full compliance with its obligations under the Convention.

2. Implementation of specific articles of the Convention

Articles I and IV

Articles I and IV of the Convention are given effect in the Netherlands by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Act, as described above. The Netherlands has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained:

- microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types or in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
- weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article III

With regard to article III (obligation not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention) the Netherlands has implemented the following national or European regulations:

- National Decree on Export of Strategic Goods 1963, as amended on 20 December 1993;
- Decision and Regulation of the Council of the European Community on 19 December 1994, entered into force on 1 July 1995, establishing a community regime for the control of exports of dual use goods.

Article V

The Netherlands has participated in all rounds (on an annual basis) of information exchange in the framework of the Confidence Building Measures, agreed upon by the Second and Third Review Conferences.

Article IX

The Netherlands has signed and ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, respectively on 13 January 1993 and 30 June 1995.

Article X

Concerning the implementation of article X of the Convention (States Parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents for peaceful purposes; implementation of

the Convention in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties), on 7 December 1995 at the Third Session of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference the Netherlands presented a working paper (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.45) with an overview of a number of cooperation projects with several developing countries, States Parties to the Convention, in the field of bacteriology (biology). A copy of that paper is annexed to this document.

- The Netherlands has ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity on 12 July 1994.

ANNEX

BCW/AD HOC GROUP/WP.45
7 December 1995

Working paper submitted by the Netherlands

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE X OF THE BTWC

Objective

The objective of the Ad Hoc Group is to consider appropriate measures including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the BTWC, to be included as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument. In this context, the AHG shall, inter alia, consider: (the fourth tick of the AHG's mandate)

- specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of article X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.

Introduction

The Second Review Conference in 1986 and the Third Review Conference in 1991 noted with concern the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas. Both Conferences urged all States Parties actively to promote international cooperation and exchange with States Parties in the peaceful uses of biotechnology. Furthermore, both Conferences urged the developed countries possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote technology transfer and international cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind.

As an illustration that international cooperation and the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes between the developed and the developing countries are being undertaken, the Netherlands has made an inventory of its cooperation projects with a number of developing countries, States Parties to the BTWC, in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of infectious diseases, or for other peaceful purposes (including the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information) in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Fields of cooperation between developing countries and the Netherlands

Netherlands universities, research institutes, companies and the Government of the Netherlands cooperate with universities, research

institutes, companies and Governments of a number of developing countries in the field of bio(techno)logy. A brief enumerative description of the fields of cooperation is given below (a more extensive and detailed description of the joint activities can be found in Annex I):

Health care

Human vaccine production

The aim of these projects is to improve immunization programmes against human and childhood diseases. The following vaccines are produced: oral polio vaccine, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus and measles vaccines.

These projects include research, quality control, purification of toxoids and transfer of equipment (fermenters, clean room systems and processing equipment), technology and of scientific information. Personnel is trained and students are educated (in the Netherlands as well as in the developing country).

Furthermore, scientists are trained and educated in the field of biomedical research development and of serological techniques.

Malaria control

Vaccine research with the aim to develop vaccines to combat malaria. These projects include expression and production of inhibitors of DNA-polymerases of P. Falciparum (by using molecular biology techniques), production of antibodies, research into drugs resistance and immunity. Equipment and materials are exchanged, such as incubators, low-speed centrifuges, gel electrophoresis equipment, oligonucleotides, synthetic peptides, monoclonals and materials for cell culture and molecular biology work. Personnel is trained and students are educated.

Prevention of Dengue Fever

This project aims to study background mechanisms of Dengue Fever, which eventually should lead to a decreased morbidity and mortality of this disease.

Human nutrition and microbiology

The objective of this project is to improve education and research in the field of human nutrition and microbiology. The project includes training and education of students and improvement of research facilities.

Improvement of biosafety standards

Cooperation projects with the objective to improve biosafety standards. In the framework of these projects scientists, teachers and students are exchanged, trained and educated.

Agriculture

Herd health

Cooperation in the field of herd health and epidemiology. The project includes improvement of research facilities and clinical education and training of personnel.

Strengthening of biotechnological research and plant breeding

This project includes research activities and training, education and exchange of students and post-doctoral fellows.

Animal and plant health

Cooperation in the field of veterinary medicine (e.g. goat diseases). These projects include education of students and training of personnel. Equipment is transferred and epidemiological research is conducted.

Master of Science programme in crop science

Students from developing countries are trained in the Netherlands in the field of crop science. This programme includes improving biotechnological techniques.

Biotechnology

Students are educated and personnel is trained in the field of nucleic acid technology

Students are educated and personnel is trained in the field of biotechnology

Microbial fermentation biology

Cooperation project in the field of applied microbial fermentation biology. Students are educated and a laboratory is created.

ANNEX I

Benin

Cooperation between the National University of Benin and the Agricultural University of Wageningen, the University of Utrecht and the University of Amsterdam. The objective of this project is to improve the education and research in the field of human nutrition and microbiology. The project includes education and training of students as well as improvement of research facilities.

China

Cooperation between the National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (Netherlands) and three Chinese pharmaceutical centres: Institute of Medical Biology (Kunming, Yunnan), Lanzhou Institute of Biological Products (Gansu) and the Shanghai Institute of Biological Products.

The aim of this project is improving the coverage and cost-effectiveness of the national immunization programme against the main childhood diseases through construction and rehabilitation of three national vaccine production centres for the production of essential vaccines (oral polio vaccine, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus vaccines and the measles vaccine) meeting international quality standards.

This project includes exchanges of equipment (fermenters, clean room systems, processing equipment) and scientific information, and training of personnel.

Chinese students are educated and trained in the field of biotechnology (Agricultural University of Wageningen) and nucleic acid technology (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

Colombia

Cooperation between the National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (Netherlands) and Colombia in the field of local vaccine production. This project includes transfer of technology.

Costa Rica

Cooperation between the National University in Heredia and the Utrecht University in the field of herd health and epidemiology. The project includes improvement of clinical education and research and training of personnel.

Cuba

Cuban students are educated and trained in the field of biotechnology (Agricultural University of Wageningen) and nucleic acid technology (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam)

Ghana

Ghanaian students are educated and trained in the field of nucleic acid technology (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

India

Indian students are educated and trained in the field of serological diagnostic techniques (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

Indonesia

Cooperation between the National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (Netherlands), and Bio Pharma (Indonesia, Bandung) in the field of local vaccine production (from 1990 to 1992). This project includes production of bacterial vaccines, antigen production (diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis), purification of toxoid and sera, training of personnel (in the Netherlands and in Indonesia), exchange of materials, equipment and scientific and technological information for the benefit of vaccine production.

Cooperation between the Centre for Plant Improvement and Reproduction (CPRO-DLO) in Wageningen and several Indonesian research institutes and universities in the field of biotechnological research and plant breeding.

Cooperation between the Academical Hospital Nijmegen and the University Diponegoro (Semarang). This project focuses on background mechanisms of Dengue Fever, which may lead to a decreased morbidity and mortality of this disease.

Indonesian students are educated and trained in the field of nucleic acid technology and serological diagnostic techniques (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

Iran

Iranian students are educated and trained in the field of nucleic acid technology and serological diagnostic techniques (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

Kenya

Kenyan students are educated and trained in the field of nucleic acid technology and serological diagnostic techniques (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

Thailand

Cooperation between the University of Utrecht and the Mahidol University in Bangkok. This project includes vaccine research concerning the prevention

of malaria, expression and production of inhibitors of DNA-polymerases of P. Falciparum, production of antibodies, cloning of DNA-polymerases, research into drugs resistance and immunity. Exchange of equipment and materials, such as incubators, gel electrophoresis equipment, centrifuges, micro pipets, oligonucleotides, synthetic peptides, materials for cell culture work, monoclonals, materials for molecular biology work.

Scientists and student are educated and trained in the field of serological diagnostic techniques (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

Viet Nam

Cooperation project between the National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (Netherlands), Bio Pharma (Indonesia, Bandung) and the Institute of Vaccines and Biological Substance (Viet Nam). This project includes production of vaccines for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis.

Cooperation between the University of Hanoi and the Universities of Leiden, and Amsterdam and the Agricultural University of Wageningen in the field of applied microbial fermentation biology.

Cooperation between the Agricultural University of Hue and the Agricultural University of Wageningen in the field of veterinary medicine (1979-1985).

Students are educated and scientists are trained in the field of biomedical research development and serological diagnostic techniques (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

Zimbabwe

Cooperation project between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe for improving its biosafety standards. Exchange of scientists, teachers and students with the Biocentre Amsterdam (Netherlands).

Zimbabwean students are educated and trained in the field of nucleic acid technology and serological diagnostic techniques (Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam).

New Zealand

New Zealand accordingly attaches a copy of the 1996 declaration provided to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs in New York in fulfilment of the confidence-building measures agreed by the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. (See CDA/11-96/BW-III, pp. 332-336.)

Pakistan

Pakistan as a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is fully complying with all its obligations under the Convention.

Philippines

The Armed Forces of the Philippines does not have biological/bacteriological weapons in its inventory and does not intend to possess them.

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea, in conformity with its legal commitments, fully complies with the objectives and principles of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction (BWC) and has not violated any of its provisions.

The Republic of Korea has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained any microbial, or other biological agents or toxins for weapon purposes, nor the means of their delivery, as specified in article I of the Convention. The Republic of Korea is in full compliance with article III.

Pursuant to the 1991 adoption of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the parties to the BWC, the Republic of Korea has submitted annually, since 1992, all relevant information to the Secretary-General.

In addition, in view of the importance of the regular exchange of information with the States Parties including background information on outbreaks of infectious diseases within its territory, the Government of the Republic of Korea has been engaged in epidemiological disease information dissemination by publishing the Communicable Diseases Monthly Report since 1990 and participating in the Surveillance Programme of WHO.

The Republic of Korea also participated in the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections of the facilities involved in Iraq's biological weapons programme.

The Government of the Republic of Korea signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) on 14 January 1993. The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea has completed the domestic procedure for the ratification of this Convention, and the Government of the Republic of Korea expects to deposit its instrument of ratification with the United Nations Secretary-General in the near future.

In accordance with article X, the Republic of Korea has actively participated in international exchanges of scientific and technological information relating to the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

All research and development in the Republic of Korea involving the use of micro-organisms and toxins is conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes and the results of such R & D have been published.

Since 1994, the Government of the Republic of Korea has worked jointly with UNDP and WHO to establish the International Vaccine Institute (IVI) in Seoul. This Institute will be dedicated to the capacity-building of developing countries in the development and use of vaccines, particularly for children and the economically disadvantaged. The Institute will receive financial and institutional support from UNDP and the Government of the Republic of Korea. Additional funding is being sought for the Institute's programmes from other government and non-government agencies, as well as the private sector. The official signing ceremony of the Agreement on the Establishment of the IVI will be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 28 October 1996.

Russian Federation

1. The Russian Federation complies unswervingly with all provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Russia has never developed, produced, stockpiled or stored biological weapons.

2. Over the period since the Third Review Conference, the Russian Federation has passed legislation and laws aimed at ruling out the very possibility of acting in breach of the 1972 Convention. Among other things, it has taken steps to ensure compliance with the Convention: a Decree by the President of the Federation (1992) whereby the formulation or execution of biological programmes in breach of the Convention and compliance with the Convention is monitored; an addition to the Penal Code making activities in breach of the Convention a criminal offence, and corresponding additions to the Customs Code (1993). Instructions by the President of the Federation and Orders by the Russian Government (1992, 1994) have imposed export controls on agents inducing diseases in humans, animals and plants and on "dual-purpose" equipment.

3. In keeping with the closing declaration of the Third Review Conference, the Russian Federation provides the United Nations with information every year on biological facilities and activities of relevance to the Convention. This information includes details of the national research and development

programme on defence against biological weapons, research centres and laboratories, vaccine-manufacturing facilities, conferences, symposiums, publications and other activities.

The Russian Federation values the decisions taken at the Third Review Conference about the submission to the United Nations of information on confidence-building measures and the exchange of such information among States Parties, since this helps to make the Convention more effective. As a depositary, Russia has drawn the attention of States Parties to the need for all States to provide this information, in view of the contribution it makes to an atmosphere of openness as regards compliance with the Convention.

4. The Russian Federation favours the development of an effective mechanism for monitoring compliance with the Convention, and regards the work done by the Ad Hoc Group set up by the Special Conference of the States Parties (September 1994) to consider and incorporate appropriate means of verification into a legally binding document in a positive light. It has put forward concrete suggestions concerning the questions of principle implicit in the future monitoring mechanism, touching on the definitions of basic terms (the conceptual apparatus) and the lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins accepted for discussion by the States Parties. It is convinced that the efficacy of the monitoring mechanism will largely depend on the fulfilment of objective criteria, and hence regards the imposition of quantitative thresholds as an important condition for the enforcement of article I. It supports the principal findings of the Ad Hoc Group and efforts to stimulate a full-scale negotiating process so as to establish fair, non-discriminatory arrangements for strengthening the Convention on a comprehensive footing.

5. The Russian Federation calls for specific moves to establish collaboration for peaceful purposes, including exchanges of equipment, materials, and scientific information on the uses of biological agents and toxins. It regards as essential coordination among the States Parties in monitoring compliance with the Convention; international conferences, seminars and symposiums on biological research into, and work involving, pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins; the formulation of joint research and training programmes in biology and biotechnology; and consultations on difficulties in complying with the Convention.

6. The Russian Federation regards making the Biological Weapons Convention into a potent international instrument as a priority in military and political security, and calls on all States that have not yet signed or ratified it to do so immediately.

Slovakia

1. Considering common efforts of the world community concerning the arms control and disarmament, global stability and international peace as one of the most important duties, the Slovak Republic has taken every possible measure to ensure its compliance with all the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and has the honour to announce that the fulfilment of the duties has been met with success.

2. Having in mind the irreplaceable role of confidence-building measures, the Slovak Republic on a regular basis contributes to the Reports in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention (Ref. CDA/11-96/BW-III of 22 May 1996, p. 419).

3. It is imperative that the verification regime be bolstered in the nearest future in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention. In this respect the Slovak Republic takes part in every effort approaching this goal, including the work of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention and other relevant activities.

4. In respect of the new scientific and technological development there is no information of national character available, which could be considered relevant to the Convention.

Ukraine

Ukraine does not have any new information as to scientific and technological achievements (that may concern the BWC) to transmit to the secretariat of the Preparatory Committee for the inclusion into the reference document concerning the compliance with obligations of the States Parties to the BWC.

Ukraine strictly complies with all provisions of the BWC, it does not have any biological weapons, has never engaged in the development of military programmes aimed at creation of such weapons. This issue has been already duly reflected in annual Declarations on implementation of the BWC, transmitted by Ukraine to the United Nations Secretariat.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The following information is supplied in response to the request of the Secretariat at the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition on the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as contained in paragraph 21 of the Preparatory Committee's report (BWC/CONF.IV/1).

Article I

Since its ratification of the Convention, the United Kingdom has not developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained biological agents or toxins of types or in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. The United Kingdom maintains only small quantities of potential biological warfare agents for peaceful, primarily research and prophylactic, purposes. These are held under strict supervision and control. No delivery systems designed to use these agents for hostile purposes exist, nor are any being developed.

Article II

The provisions of article II of the Convention impose obligations only upon those States Parties which possess or have under their jurisdiction or control, biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I. Since its ratification of the Convention the United Kingdom has not fallen into this category of States Parties.

Article III

The United Kingdom continues to comply with the provisions of article III. The export control measures through which the United Kingdom fulfils its obligations under this article are provided for under the following legislation, currently in force:

- The export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 which implements controls on military goods, and
- The Regulation of the Council of the European Community (3381/94) and the Dual-Use and Related Goods (Export Control) Regulations 1995 which provides the legal basis in the United Kingdom for the control of exports of dual-use goods.

Article IV

The Biological Weapons Act was enacted on 8 February 1974. This legislation provides for the necessary measures to be taken under domestic law to enable the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations under the Convention.

Article V

In accordance with the provisions of article V, the United Kingdom along with the other Depositary Powers (the United States and Russian Federation) agreed in 1992 a Trilateral Statement which addresses issues arising from the Soviet Union's non-compliance with the Convention.

Article VI

The United Kingdom ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 May 1996 and continues to play an active role in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the OPCW in the Hague to prepare for the entry into force and implementation of the Convention.

Article X

In accordance with the provisions of this article, the United Kingdom supports and is actively involved in the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin agents for peaceful purposes; and cooperates with other States and international organizations towards the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease and for other peaceful purposes.

To this end, the United Kingdom makes a significant contribution in a variety of relevant fields. These include:

- The United Kingdom's ratification on 3 June 1994 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The United Kingdom has since contributed £130 million in multilateral aid in the biodiversity field, including to the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
- Similarly, £22 million in bilateral aid for biodiversity projects in 1995/96. Resources are committed to research and studies and more widely with NGOs through the Joint Funding Scheme (JFS).
- £3 million annually to the Darwin Initiative for the Survival of Species, launched at the Earth Summit in 1992, to safeguard the world's biodiversity. To date, funding has been directed to over 100 projects in 60 countries.
- £6 million since 1991 in bilateral aid for research projects involving the use of viral and bacteriological agents for peaceful purposes, e.g. pest control; and to the study of bacteriological diseases.
- Voluntary contributions to the World Health Organization totalling £4.5 million in 1996/1997, in addition to the United Kingdom's assessed contribution. Examples include £2 million to the Emerging and Other Common Diseases Programme, £900,000 to the Tropical Disease Research Programme, £500,000 to the Dracunculiasis Control Programme, £200,000 to the Onchocerciasis Programme, £200,000 to the Tuberculosis Control Programme and £100,000 to the Global Programme of Vaccination.
- The joint United Kingdom/Netherlands initiative to develop draft International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology. The Guidelines, adopted by UNEP in late 1995, set out general principles and considerations regarding safety, approaches to the assessment and management of risk in biotechnology, mechanisms for regional, national and international safety.
- Work by the United Kingdom's Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research (CAMR), including interaction with India over the joint development of an improved tuberculosis vaccine; an exchange with the Brazilian Ministry of Health on the development and availability of vaccines against pertussis, and the development of a new network for interchange of information on exotic viral diseases, in collaboration with the Arbovirus and Haemorrhagic Fever Unit in Geneva, operated under the auspices of the World Health Organization.

- Medical Research Council (MRC) collaborative activities in developing countries in the area of bacteriological research, including a significant programme of research on problems of tropical diseases at the MRC Laboratories in The Gambia; and a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ugandan Government relating to MRC research work at its facilities at the Ugandan Virological Research Institute, principally in the field of AIDS/HIV.

Article XIV and Article XV

In performance of its duties as a Depositary Government the United Kingdom has fully complied with the terms of paragraph 5 of article XIV and with the provisions of article XV.
